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ABSTRACT 
This  paper analyzes  the  consequences  for  the United States of a  partial reform 
of world rice trade.  It is argued that likely trade  reform would occur  in the 
japonica rice producing countries of Japan,  South Korea,  Taiwan,  and  the 
European  Community.  Multilateral rice trade liberalization would have  strong 
effects for medium  grain rice in the United States.  The  strength of these 
effects might not be felt for  a  couple  of years after the liberalization has 
begun because  of minimal Japanese  imports  in the first couple  of years of 
liberalization.  U.S.  rice millers will likely benefit more  than producers. 
California producers would be  the major beneficiaries of more  open world rice 
markets. 
Keywords:  trade liberalization,  rice,  japonica rice,  agricultural trade, 
simulation model 1 
PARTIAL  REFORM  OF  WORLD  RICE  TRADE: 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Introduction 
Since  1986  the United States Government has been pursuing the  goal of more 
liberalized agricultural trade at the Uruguay  round of the General Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT).  It has  also pursued this goal  in various bilateral forums 
involving countries like Japan,  Canada,  and more  lately Mexico,  among  others.  In 
negotiations,  the  Government has  de  facto authority to  represent domestic  producing 
and consuming  groups  that will be  affected by  the  terms  or outcomes  of the 
negotiations.  However,  any  agreement must eventually receive majority backing in the 
U.S.  Congress  to become  part of U.S.  law.  Therefore,  the  executive branch of the 
U.S.  Government needs  the  support of commodity  groups  that would be  affected by  the 
proposed course of action.  Also,  for  their part,  these  groups  need  information upon 
which  to base  their position of support or opposition. 
One  group,  among  many,  that could be  affected by  trade negotiations  are U.S.  rice 
producers.  An  issue of concern for  them  is that most rice that is traded 
internationally is rice that has been milled.  They  see  immediate benefits  from  trade 
liberalization accruing to  the processing sector  (well  represented politically by an 
industry group called the U.S.  Rice Millers'  Association).  They  question the  degree 
to which  expanded market opportunities will benefit them as  primary producers  who 
sell their product  to  the millers.  Although  there is sure  to be  some  benefit,  is it 
of sufficient degree  to offset any sacrifice that might be  asked of them  as  a  result 
of a  trade liberalization agreement? There have been several multicommodity trade liberalization studies that have 
included rice.  Prominent are  those  completed by Tyers  and Anderson  (1986),  Parikh, 
Fischer,  Frohberg,  and Gulbrandsen  (1988),  and Roningen and Dixit  (1989).  Results 
from  these studies have  not been necessarily consistent.  (See  Childs  (1990)  for  a 
summary  and discussion of the results.)  As  Magiera and Herlihy  (1988)  have  pointed 
out,  liberalization results  from  these studies depend primarily on  the measurement 
of support given by  governments  to their respective  and various  commodity  producing 
and  consuming sectors.  Because  these  studies use differing base years  in which 
support is measured,  and because that support varies  from year-to-year, 
liberalization results tend to differ. 
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Another  problem is that these studies have  ignored rice product characteristics that 
effectively segment world rice markets  by varietal type  (japonica,  indica,  basmati, 
glutinous),  by processing stage  (rough,  brown,  parboiled,  regular milled),  and by 
quality level  (low,  medium,  high).  A significant and understandable part of the 
problem is a  lack of suitable detail in international rice data.  Nonetheless,  more 
recent studies have  dealt with the  segmented world rice market.  Bateman  (1988) 
examined  the  consequences  of Japanese  rice trade liberalization by  focusing  on 
japonica rice,  the  type of rice  the Japanese  produce  and strongly prefer to  consume. 
Dixit and Roningen  (1991)  emphasized the  importance  of product differentiation in 
tracing through the  economic  impact of a  Japanese  rice trade liberalization. 
Cramer,  Wailes,  Phillips,  and Goroski  (1990)  used a  spatial equilibrium model  of 
world rice trade that differentiated between japonica,  high-quality indica,  and  low-
quality indica to  examine  consequences  of worldwide  rice trade  reform. 
The  purpose  of this study is to  examine  the  consequences  of a  partial rice trade 
liberalization on the United States.  Like  the  Cramer  and others'  study,  rice is 3 
segmented into three distinct markets:  japonica,  high-quality indica,  and  low-
quality indica.  The  study emphasizes  the  timing of the effects of the  liberalization 
and traces  through  the effects on  the  domestic distribution of both rough  and milled 
rice.  The  study emphasizes  adjustments  occurring in the world japonica rice market. 
(It is argued later that only a  small set of countries,  basically japonica producers 
in East Asia and Europe,  are likely to reform their rice trade as  consequence  of any 
GATT  initiated reform.)  The  model  is calibrated to  data averaged over  the  1986-88 
period and projects out  through  the  1996  crop year.  As  alluded to,  an  important 
issue  is the degree  to which  the u.s.  rice producing sector is affected by  the 
hypothesized liberalization scenario. 
This paper is organized as  follows.  The  next section describes  the world rice 
market,  and draws  out  implications for  trade modeling.  The  following  section 
presents  a  summary  of the modeling approach.  Next,  liberalization scenarios  from  the 
model  are examined.  Particular attention is devoted to  the effect of reform in the 
liberalizing countries,  and  on the u.s.  rice producing,  milling,  and  consuming 
sectors. 
World Rice  Market 
Most  production of rice  (90 percent)  takes place  in Asia.  The  largest producers  --
China,  India,  Indonesia,  Bangladesh  -- account  for  70  percent of the world's  total 
production.  Production in this region is particularly vulnerable  to  the 
uncertainties of the  timing of the Asian monsoon because  50  percent of the Asian 
crop  is not irrigated.  The  largest non-Asian producers  are  in order:  Brazil,  United 
States,  European Community  (Italy,  Spain),  and Australia.  This  group  accounts  for  5 4 
percent of the world's production. 
Most  of the world's  consumption,  nearly  90  percent,  takes place  in Asia.  Except  for 
Pakistan,  rice is the primary staple commodity.  Even  so,  per capita rice consumption 
is falling as  income  levels rise.  Ito and others  (1989)  estimate negative  income 
elasticities for rice for  the  following Asian countries:  Japan,  Malaysia,  Nepal, 
Singapore,  Thailand,  Taiwan,  and Bangladesh.  Other Asian countries  in the  study 
(India,  South Korea,  Sri Lanka,  Burma,  China,  Indonesia,  and  the  Philippines)  have 
positive-valued income  elasticities but  they tend to be  small,  and except for  Sri 
Lanka,  are declining in value  over  time.  Rice  is facing competition from  lower 
priced wheat  in most Asian diets.  Countries where  rice consumption is rising are 
situated outside Asia,  especially in the Middle  East  and  in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Unlike wheat  and  feedgrains,  very little unmilled rice enters  into world  trade. 
Unmilled rice still contains  the hulls whose  low value  and bulk make  shipments 
uneconomical  over  long distances  (Slayton,  1984).  More  highly processed rice that 
enters  into world trade  is at a  price disadvantage  relative to wheat  that can be 
shipped more  economically in bulk.  Also,  importation of rice loses political backing 
from  import processing sectors  in destination countries because most processing 
takes place  in the  source country. 
As  mentioned earlier,  there is significant stratification in world rice markets. 
There  are  four  types  of rice  --glutinous,  basmati,  japonica,  and  indica.  They  are 
distinguished by starch content and cooking qualities  (Slayton).  Trade  in glutinous 
and basmati is relatively unimportant  -- most  rice trade  takes place  in japonica 
(about  16 percent)  and  indica.  Japonica is a  medium-grain rice  grown  in temperate 5 
regions.  These  regions  include Japan,  North and  South Korea,  Taiwan,  northern 
China,  southern Brazil,  Australia,  the Mediterranean area,  and California.  Indica 
rice is a  long-grain rice  grown  in tropical or sub-tropical regions.  These  regions 
encompass  China,  south and southeast Asia,  and  the  southern United States.  There  are 
only limited substitution possibilities between japonica and  indica in either 
production or consumption. 
Japonica and indica rice are  further categorized by quality:  high,  medium,  and  low. 
Quality characteristics depend basically on the percentage of brokens,  as well as 
translucency of the grain,  chalkiness,  and uniformity  (Slayton).  Indica rice can be 
either parboiled or regular milled.  (In parboiling the rice is steamed before hull 
removal  -- the bran blends with the  inner kernel.)  As  between japonica and indica, 
there  is little substitution in demand  among  rice quality classifications,  or 
between parboiled and regular milled. 
World  trade in rice is a  very small percentage of total production,  about  3  to 4 
percent.  Most  major rice producing and consuming countries pursue  self-sufficiency 
policies.  They not only limit imports but also subsidize  the use  of high yielding 
rice varieties.  Most  of these countries provide  short-term credit and maintain large 
stocks  (Childs,  1990).  The  world market is viewed as  a  residual source of supply or 
an outlet for surplus production.  Given the unstable nature of the world rice 
market,  rice investment  in nonexporting countries has  outstripped that in the 
traditional exporting countries.  As  a  consequence,  yield growth  in exporting regions 
has  lagged as potential  import markets  have  made  themselves  smaller by  increasing 
productive capacity while  experiencing declines  in domestic  demand. 6 
In the medium  term,  rice trade reform is most  likely to occur  in countries where 
japonica rice is produced and consumed.  These  include  the East Asian countries of 
Japan,  South Korea,  and Taiwan,  and  the  European Community  (EC).  The  East Asian 
countries have effectively cut the  linkage between domestic  rice prices  and world 
prices.  Although  these countries may  enter the world market sporadically,  they can 
be best termed as self-sufficient.  Their self-sufficiency,  however,  is the result of 
producer  and consumer  rice prices being several multiples of world price levels. 
Because  these countries are major exporters  of manufactured products,  they are 
typically targeted as  countries  that can afford to  import more  of many  products,  not 
the least of which  is rice.  Like  its East Asian counterparts,  t~e EC  severs  the 
linkage of domestic  and world prices but,  unlike  them,  is a  japonica exporter.  EC 
exporters receive  generous  export subsidizes that guarantee  the  EC  product is 
competitive  in the world market.  Although  the  EC  is not a  large japonica exporter, 
its policies are  frequently  targeted because it employs  the  same  set of policy 
instruments  (that is,  export restitutions)  in promoting grain exports where it is a 
major player. 
Less  reform is likely to occur  in major  indica producing and  consuming countries. 
Most  indica producing countries are  less developed countries whose  capacity to 
increase  imports  is not particularly large.  Although many  of these countries have 
pursued self-sufficiency in rice production,  they have  not necessarily guaranteed 
producers prices higher  than world levels.  For  instance,  domestic prices are  lower 
than world prices  in India,  Bangladesh,  and  Indonesia.  Thailand,  the major world 
indica exporter,  has  minimal  producer support  and has  tended to  tax rather than 
subsidize exports until the mid-1980's.  In Pakistan support  to producers  as  measured 
by producer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE's)  has  more  often than not been negative 7 
throughout  the  1980's  (Webb  and others,  1990).  Likewise,  Burma  does  not subsidize 
its exports.  Two  large  indica producers  and  sometime  exporters  - China  and Vietnam  -
are not members  of GATT,  and  do  not necessarily abide by  GATT  regulations. 
Modeling Approach 
One  of the primary tasks  of this study is to construct a  world rice trade model  that 
will allow analysis of rice trade  reform.  Because  trade liberalization is likely to 
be  gradual,  a  dynamic  modeling  framework  (that is,  one  that shows  year-to-year 
changes)  is used to trace out  the  consequent adjustments  in production,  consumption, 
stocks,  trade,  and prices.  The  guiding philosophy behind this model building 
exercise is simplicity and  transparency. 
There  are  several  important aspects of the world rice market captured in the 
modeling  framework.  These  include:  (1)  differences  in rice varieties and quality 
levels,  with limited production and/or  consumption substitution possibilities 
between  them;  (2)  in the United States,  the  geographic distribution of rice 
production;  the  end uses  of rough  and milled rice;  and  the  functioning of U.S.  rice 
policy mechanisms,  especially the  acreage  reduction program  (ARP);  (3)  in Japan, 
acreage  diversion programs;  (4)  in general,  the  residual nature of rice trade  among 
those countries where  trade  is controlled by  the state;  and per capita consumption 
trends  in Asia  (declining)  and in other areas  (increasing). 
Countries  and regions 
The  world is divided into 4  rice trading blocks.  Table  1  shows  the blocks  and  the 
countries/regions constituting each of the blocks.  The  United States constitutes one of the blocks.  The 
second block consists 
of a  set of 
countries/regions 
called market 
adjusters.  These 
countries/regions are 
presumed to be either 
open to  some  degree of 
world rice market 
forces  or potentially 
so  (as  in the case of 
Japan,  South Korea, 
and Taiwan)'.  Price 
responsive  supply and 
demand  functions  are 





Uni ted States 
Market  adjusters (actual  or potential) 
Brazil 
European  Caaarai ty 
Middle  East 
Japan 





West  Africa 
Gov.rna.nt  controllad and/or aggregate  regional  group 
Mexico' Central  America 
Rest  of SOUth  America 
North  Africa 
China 
North  Korea 
au .... 
Indonesia 
Sma II i  IIf)Orters 
Canada 
Other  Western  Europe 





Rest  of  South  Asia 
Soviet Union 
Rest  of  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Rest  of  WOrld 
used to model  the rice sectors  in these countries/regions. 
The  third block is labeled "state controlled"  countries.  As  the  name  implies,  rice 
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trade  in most of these countries is controlled by  the  government.  In most,  the world 
rice market  is viewed as  a  residual source of supply or as  a  place  to  dump 
unanticipated surpluses.  Supply and  demand  relationships  in these countries are 
modeled  in terms  of time  trend equations.  Ending stock equations  are estimated and 
used to model  adjustments  in rice stocks.  Trade  is determined residually without 
regard to changes  in world prices.  In some  of the  regions  (such as  Mexico  and 
Central America or Rest of South America),  trade may  not be strictly state 9 
controlled,  but the  trade is modeled as  such due  to  the aggregation of many 
countries.  (It is more  tractable to use  trend relationships for certain regional 
aggregates  rather than use weighted averages  of supply and demand elasticities where 
trade and domestic policies may  be  substantially different.)  The  fourth set of 
countries are rice importers.  These  countries produce  no  rice of their own.  Their 
rice  import behavior  seems  to be well  captured in terms  of trend consumption 
equations. 
Table  2  provides an overview of endogenous variables for each block,  and a  short 
description of the  functional  form of the corresponding model  equation.  The  model  is 
synthetic:  elasticity values  and U.S.  demand  share values used in the model  are 
taken  from  other studies.  Table  3  lists these elasticity values  and documents  the 
sources  from which  they were  taken. 
Data limitations  and rice  types 
This  study distinguishes between japonica and  indica,  and eliminates glutinous  and 
basmati  from world trade analysis.  All quantity data except for  the United States 
come  from  supply and utilization data collected by  the  Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS).  U.S.  data are  from USDA's  Rice  Situation and Outlook Yearbook  (1990).  The 
model's base period is an average of the  1986-88 period.  Ending  stock levels are set 
equal  to actual ending stocks  in 1989,  and beginning stocks are set to  assure  supply 
and utilization balance  in each country/region. 
Capturing varietal and quality differences  can be  termed an  inexact art.  Estimates 
of glutinous production and  trade  (Slayton,  1984;  Bateman,  1988)  and basmati Table  2  -- Endogenous  variables  and  equation functional  fOrm 










lagged  adjustment 




Region  Variable 
United Stat..  base  acreage 
Market  adjusters 
State controlled 
I~rter 
acreage  reduction 





seed  demand 
rough  export  demand 
Mill i ng  demand 
di rect  food  demand 
processed  food  demancI 






consLlllpt i on demand 
stock  demancI 
trade 
production 
Cor'lSLlllpt i on 
stock demand 
trade 
Cor'lSLlllpt i on 
trade 
yzapb 









Functional  for. 
IIIOving  average 















constant elasticity or  trend 
product 
constant elasticity 
lagged  adjustment  or  residual 
residual  or exogenous 
trend 
trend 





production and trade  (Yamada,  1975;  Slayton,  1984)  were  used to  isolate japonica and 
indica.  Estimates  from  Slayton  (1984),  Henneberry  (1985),  and Bateman  (1988)  were 
used to distinguish between japonica and indica.  Table  4  shows  base period supply Table  3  -- Model  price elasticities 





Food  demand: 
Direct consunpt i on 
long  grain 
Mediua  grain 
Processed consunption 
long  grain 
Mediua  grain 
Broken 
2.  Other au'ltries/regions 
Austral ia 
Brazil 
European  COIlIlUli ty 
Japan 
Middle  East 
Own  price 
Japan 




European  COIlIlUli ty 
Japan 






Source:  Grant,  Beach,  and  lin (1984). 
2 Source:  Childs  (1989). 











Demand  share parameters2 
.768 
.232 
Brewer  demand: 
Broken 
Whole 
long  grain  .500 
Medium  grain  .500 



















South  Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
West  Africa 
Acreage  harvested 
Japan 
South  Korea 
Taiwan 
Pakistan 
South  Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 

























3  Source:  Sullivan,  Wainio,  Roningen  (1989),  long  run  supply elasticities adjusted to short-term equivalent, 
assuming  2  year supply adjustment  period. 
4  Source:  Ito,  Wailes,  and  Grant  (1985). 
5  Source:  Sullivan,  Wainio,  Roningen  (1989),  long  run  supply elasticity adjusted to short·term equivalent, 
assuming  4 year supply adjustment  period. 
6  Source:  Wailes,  Ito,  and  Cramer  (1991),  Table  17. 
7  Source:  Ito,  Peterson,  and  Grant  (1989). 12 
I~l~ !  -- Ig§~ X!!r  §~l~  and  Y1iiization 
Countries/regions  BS1  AREA  PRON  CONS  ES 
1000  metric  Sons 
Japonica rice 
Mexico' Central  America2  0  0  0  30  0 
Brazil  323  633  832  792  374 
European  COIlIIIJI'li ty  358  337  1296  881  381 
Other  Western  Europe  6  0  0  99  6 
Middle  East  0  12  33  263  0 
North  Africa  0  75  292  305  0 
China  1726  2247  8415  8598  1393 
Japan  1337  2194  9nO  9657  1450 
North  Korea  0  880  3860  3684  0 
South  Korea  1192  1002  4574  4478  1288 
Taiwan  743  446  1560  1486  654 
Indonesia  0  0  0  83  0 
Austral ia  360  96  483  87  321 
Soviet Union
3  25  543  1470  1932  25 
Rest  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  42  396  355  348  49 
Rest  of  World  283  789  970  1802  283 
Indica rice 
Canada  0  0  0  154  0 
Mexico' Central  America2  264  657  1454  2154  205 
Brazi l  2609  5114  6734  6410  3028 
Rest  of  South  America  614  1384  3476  3251  547 
European  Community  32  0  0  831  32 
Other  Western  Europe  7  0  0  122  7 
Middle  East  418  438  1170  3733  507 
North  Africa  12  344  1334  1394  12 
China  20707  29859  111802  114307  18507 
Hong  Kong  65  0  0  441  65 
South  Korea  298  251  1144  1120  322 
Taiwan  91  55  193  208  81 
Burlll8  399  4559  7140  6602  498 
Indonesia  1429  9832  27000  27565  757 
Malaysia  180  640  1130  1559  110 
Singapore  22  0  0  230  11 
Thai land  1157  6243  8298  3992  502 
Viet..- 0  5672  10419  10089  0 
India  11001  40478  62648  61n8  12000 
Pakistan  283  1587  2595  1848  354 
Austral ia  14  4  20  32  14 
Rest  of  South  Asia  1275  11382  18292  18128  1225 
Soviet Union3  12  190  516  868  12 
West  Africa  329  3090  2449  4072  393 
Rest  of  Sub-Saharan Africa  166  1575  1733  2490  188 
Rest  of  World  2240  6252  7691  n22  2240 
Source:  Foreign Agricultural  Service and  author's  judgment  based  on  review  of 
Slayton  (1984),  Henneberry  (1985),  and  Bateman  (1988). 
1 BS=beginning  stocks,  AREA=area  harvested,  PRON=product i on,  CONS=cons~t  i on, 
ES=ending  stocks. 
2  Includes  Caribbean  region. 
3  Includes Eastern Europe. Table  5  Base  year  indica rice trade 
lisN_iua (Jality 
Exporter  1000  Metric  tons 
aun. 
Indoneai. 
PaldstM  51 
Rest of South Aaerica  292 
Rut of South Aaia 
ThaUand  4088 
Vi.t~ 
Uni ted Stat  ..  1786 
Total  6217 
IlIIpOI"ter 
CMacIa  1  154 
Mexico' Central  ~ica  641 
Brazil  95 
European  COIIIIU1i ty  831 
Other Western Europe  122 
Middle Eut  2652 
North  Africa  60 
China 
Hong  Kong  441 
Taiwan  5 
Malaysia  359 
Singapore  219 
India 
Australia  12 
Soviet Union
2  352 
West  Africa  210 
Rest  of Sub-Saharan Africa  64 
Rest of World 
Total  6217 















Source:  Foreign Agricultural Service and author's  judgllleOt  based on  review of 
Slayton (1984),  Henneberry  (1985>,  and Bateman  (1988). 
1  Includes Caribbean region. 
2  Includes Eastern Europe. 
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and utilization for japonica and  indica.  Indica trade is divided between high/medium 
quality (called "high"  for  simplicity)  and  low quality  (table 5).  As  can be  seen, 
japonica constitutes about  11  percent of combined japonica and  indica production, 
and about 16.5 percent of trade. 14 
U.S.  Rice  Sector 
Both japonica and  indica are  grown  in the United States.  Japonica is typically 
referred to as  either medium  or short grain rice  (hereafter referred to  as  "medium" 
since very little short grain is grown  in the United States).  Indica is referred to 
as  long grain rice.  Most  long grain production is centered in the southern portion 
of the United States:  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  and Texas.  Small 
amounts  of medium  grain are  grown  there  as well,  with Louisiana having  the most 
acreage planted to it.  (When  South Korea was  a  significant importer of U.S.  medium 
grain rice,  Louisiana was  a  major medium  grain producer.)  California produces mostly 
medium  grain rice,  although it produces  some  long grain as well. 
There  are  acreage planted equations  corresponding to  long and medium  grain rice in 
each state.  Acreage planted elasticities estimated by Grant and others  (1984)  are 
used in this study.  These elasticities represent fairly inelastic production 
responses  in the  short-run.  Because  these elasticities do  not distinguish between 
long and medium  grains,  a  Constant Elasticity of Transformation  (CET)  specification 
is overlain the  Grant production structure to derive  own  and cross price 
elasticities for each length grain.  Except  for Louisiana,  a  substitution parameter 
of -1.0 is used to allow for weak  substitutability in production.  A higher value  for 
Louisiana  (-3.0)  is used since medium  grain had a  significant foothold  there before 
there were  shifts in foreign medium  grain demand.  Acreage harvested is a  fixed 
proportion of acreage planted for  each state. 
Acreage  planted equations  are modified by ARP's  that are  required as  a  condition for 
participation in the  government's  deficiency payment  and nonrecourse  loan programs. The  Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and Trade Act of 1990  (FACT)  requires  that 
ARP's  be  adjusted to maintain a  3  year stocks-to-use ratio between 0.165  and 0.2. 
Base  acreage  to which  the ARP's  apply are  3-year moving  averages  of rice acreage 
planted and considered planted (this  includes set-aside and flex acreage).  Acreage 
participation in the  government's  program is assumed  to equal  0.92  throughout  the 
simulation period.  Set-aside acreage  is therefore calculated as  a  product of the 
program participation proportion times  a  state's base  acreage  times  the ARP. 
For  the most part,  yield trend equations  (listed in appendix  table  2  in a  longer 
version of this paper)  are used to determine yields  in the model.  These  equations 
were  estimated for this study.  Production is the product of yield and acreage 
harvested.  Production is  summed  across states and added  to beginning stocks  to 
determine  total long and medium  grain supply. 
Demand  For  Rough  Rice 
15 
Demand  for  rough rice is modeled as  corning  from  four  sources:  seed,  exports, 
carryover,  and rice millers.  Seed demand  is calculated as  a  fixed proportion of 
production.  Rough  rice export  demand  is exogenous  -- it is set equal  to  the  1986-88 
average  of 2.579 million cwt.  The  calculation of carryover demand  is based on  a 
hyperbolic price-dependent stocks equation estimated by Hoffman,  Livezey,  and 
Westcott  (1991).  Ending  stocks are  a  direct function of the previous year's rice 
utilization amount,  and an  inverse  function of the ratio of the current year's price 
to  the effective  (marketing)  loan repayment rate on nonrecourse  loans  (0.7  times  the 
loan rate). 16 
Millers'  demand  for  rough rice must  equal available  supply after considering seed, 
export,  and carryover  demand.  Millers'  demand  is modeled as  a  function of the ratio 
of the  farm price relative to an  imputed  input price derived from milled rice 
prices: 
IP(j) =MILL (j  I  WHOLE) *p.(j) +MILL (j  I  BRK) *Pm(BRK) 
where  IP  is the  imputed price of rice variety j  (- long,  medium),  MILL  represents  a 
milling ratio of rough  to milled rice  (long,  medium,  and broken),  and  Pm  is the 
milled rice price.  Millers'  demand  is negatively affected by  increases  in farm 
prices,  and positively affected by  increases  in milled prices.  Proportional 
increases  in the  farm  and  imputed  input prices leave  demand  unaffected.  Letting  DRM 
signify millers'  demand,  and  ~ signify a  negatively-valued demand  elasticity,  demand 
is represented: 
.  Pf(j) 
DRM(J) =constant* (  (  .) ). 
IP J 
The  U.S.  farm price is determined in the balancing of rough rice supply and  demand: 
DRM(j) =SRM(j) 
where  SRM  is the  supply of rough rice available for milling. 
There  are no-agreed upon values  for  ~.  This elasticity represents  an aggregate 
response  of rice millers  to  changes  in farm  and milled prices.  In the base model,  an 
elasticity equal  to  -1.0 is used.  Model  results are later analyzed using other 
elasticity values  ranging  from  -0.5  (inelastic response)  to  -9.0  (very elastic 
response).  Figure  1  shows  the  expected effect of differing elasticity values.  "S" 
represents  rough rice supply.  "D1"  represents millers'  demand  assuming  a  low 
elasticity value,  and  "Dh"  represents  the  demand  assuming  a  higher elasticity value. Figure  1 
Millers' Demand for Rough Rice 
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Both demand  curves shift upward  due  to  increased foreign demand  for milled price  (D1 
to D1',  and  Dh  to Dh').  (For purposes  of illustration,  they are  shown  to shift up  by 
the  same  amount.)  As  can be  seen,  when  demand  is fairly inelastic,  a  smaller portion 
of the price rise is transmitted to  the  farm  sector.  As  a  consequence,  less is 
supplied to milling sector for processing. 
Demand  For Milled Rice 
Domestic  demand  for U.S.  milled rice is based on Child's publication U.S.  Rice 
Distribution Patterns.  1986/87.  Domestic  demand  is separated into food  and brewer 
demand.  Food  demand  is divided into direct consumption and processed consumption. 
Within each of these classifications,  there are  specific demands  for  long grain and 
for medium  grain.  In processed consumption,  there is additionally demand  for 
brokens.  Brewer  demand  is separated into demand  for brokens  and for whole  kernels. 
There  is in the model  a  demand  equation corresponding to each of the  lowest  demand 
categories.  (For  example,  there  is a  demand  equation for  long grain rice directly 
consumed as  food.)  A constant elasticity of substitution  (CES)  demand  structure is 
used  to derive  own  and cross price elasticities for each of the  equations.  First 
stage demand elasticities for  food  and brewer  demand  are  from  Grant,  Beach,  and Lin 
(see  table 3).  There  are no  estimates of the required five elasticities of 
substitution.  Instead,  a  presumed value of 3  (a common  value used in the literature) 
is used in the base model.  (In the  longer version of this paper,  the results of 
sensitivity tests varying this value  are reported.  There it is seen that modeling 
results are  insensitive to alternative values.) 19 
Trade  is calculated as  a  residual:  milled rice supply less domestic  demand  for  long 
and medium  grains,  and for brokens.  In the world rice market,  U.S.  long grain 
competes  with high quality indica.  U.S.  medium  grain competes with japonica.  U.S. 
brokens  compete with  low quality indica. 
Market Adjusters 
nMarket  adjustingn  countries are  assumed capable of reacting to world rice price 
changes.  In the baseline scenario,  Australia,  Brazil,  the Middle  East,  Pakistan, 
Thailand,  and West Africa respond to market  forces.  Japan,  South Korea,  Taiwan,  and 
the  EC  respond only  to domestic prices  that are cut off from world prices by 
policymakers. 
There  are constant elasticity acreage harvested equations  for  each country/region 
(see  table  3  for values  and source).  Australia,  Brazil,  South Korea,  Taiwan,  and the 
Middle  East produce both japonica and  indica.  A  CET  production structure is 
superimposed  a  low elasticity of substitution of 
-1.0 is used to represent limited substitution possibilities. 
There  are  two  types of yield equations.  The  first type  are  trend equations.  These 
equations are used for  those countries  for  whom  yield has  not been found  to vary 
systematically as  function of price or acreage harvested.  The  second type  of yield 
equation is applied to Japan,  South Korea,  and Taiwan.  It has yield a  function of 
the  domestic  rice price,  and except for  South Korea,  acreage harvested.  Elasticities 
were  estimated by  Ito,  Wailes,  and Grant  (1985)  and are listed in table  3. 
Production is the product of acreage harvested and yield. Table  6  -- Rice  consumption  growth factors 
Population  Per capita  Income 
Country  growth1  incomez  elasticity 
Australia  .0162  .0247  .3003 
Brazil  .0210  .0012  .6003 
EC  .0029  .0360  .6003 
Japan  .0045  .0471  -.7084 
Pakistan  .0310  .0382  -.5345 
South Korea  .0096  .1077  .0464 
Taiwan  .0114  .0722  -.5944 
Thailand  .0174  .0938  - .4314 
West  Africa  .0340  - .0046  1.0003 
United States  .0098  .0243  .6005 
1  Source:  Urban and Rose  (1988). 
Z  Source:  IFS,  various  issues,  except for Taiwan:  CIA  (1989). 
3  Source:  author's judgment,  based on comparison with U.S.  value. 
4 Source:  Ito,  Peterson,  and Grant  (1989). 














Consumption is a  function of population growth,  per capita income  growth,  and rice 
prices.  Table  6  shows  calculated population and per capita income  growth  over the 
late 1980's.  Using  the  income  elasticities  (some  of which are negative)  from  the 
third column  (sources  identified in the table footnotes),  rice consumption growth 
factors  are calculated and  shown  in the  fourth column.  Demand  price elasticities are 
shown  in table  3.  In countries where both japonica and  indica are  consumed,  aCES 
demand  system is superimposed.  An  elasticity of substitution value of unity is used, 
assuming weak  substitution possibilities between the  two  varieties. 
Ending  stocks except for Japan,  South Korea,  and Taiwan are assumed  to follow an 
adjustment process  that makes  desired ending stocks  a  set proportion of consumption. 21 
Actual  ending stocks adjust through  time  in pursuit of the  desired level.  (This 
specification will also apply to  the  "state controlled"  countries/regions as well.  A 
detailed discussion of the specification,  along with parameter values,  appears  in 
the  longer version of this paper.)  Trade  is calculated residually. 
Ending stocks for Japan,  South Korea,  and Taiwan are  specified differently because 
policymakers  in these countries restrict rice trade  to predetermined amounts, 
usually zero.  Ending  stocks  are determined residually:  beginning stocks plus 
production less consumption.  (In liberalization scenarios where  one  or more  of these 
countries  connect  to  the world rice market,  this ending stocks  specification is 
abandoned,  and the  one  described immediately  above  is adopted.) 
A potential problem is that ending stocks may  accumulate  to undesirable  levels, 
typically too high since rice consumption in Japan and Taiwan  is declining.  Test 
runs  of the model  do  indicate a  stock accumulation problem for Japan.  With 
downwardly  rigid rice prices,  the solution to  this problem is a  modeling of the 
Japanese  acreage  reduction program.  Full details of the  acreage  reduction 
specification are  in the  longer version of this paper.  Essentially what  is done  is 
the  following:  a  trend consumption equation is estimated and fitted values  are 
projected through  the  simulation period and interpreted as  policymakers'  expected 
levels of consumption.  Desired ending stocks are calculated as  representations of 
adjustments  through  time  to  a  fixed proportion of expected consumption.  When  actual 
ending stocks  (from the model)  are higher or  lower  than 20  percent of the  desired 
level  in a  year,  a  acreage planted coefficient is adjusted to either decrease or 
increase actual acreage harvested in the model. 22 
State Controlled and  Importer Regions 
Most  countries/regions fall into  the first of these categories,  reflecting the 
thinness  of the world rice market.  Most  of these countries  do  not consistently use 
the world market  for either exporting or  importing.  (Other countries,  however,  are 
fitted into this category.  For  example,  Burma  is included although it is a 
traditional exporter.  This  categorization is made  because  government-set prices  in 
Burma  do  not closely reflect world prices and  there is little likelihood that Burma 
would be  a  party to any GATT-like  initiated reform.) 
Production and consumption are determined by  trend equations estimated for  this 
report.  (Coefficient values are listed in appendix  table 10 of the  longer version of 
this paper.)  Ending stocks are determined in the  same  manner  as  described above  for 
the non-East Asian market adjusters.  Trade  is calculated as  a  residual.  Importing 
countries are modeled  in the  same  fashion except  there are no  production equations 
and ending stocks  are  assumed constant.  Imports  are  therefore equal  to  consumption. 
Model  run 
Liberalization scenarios are evaluated with regard to  the model  run presuming that 
policies currently in place  remain in place  throughout  the  simulation period.  This 
model  run is  termed  the baseline.  The  main set of assumptions  changed in 
liberalization scenarios  are  those  that capture current policies  in Japan,  South 
Korea,  Taiwan,  and  the  EC.  Producer  incentive prices are calculated based on 
averaged USDA  PSE  data for  1986  and  1987  (Webb  and others,  1990).  Details are  shown 
in table  7.  For  example,  the Japanese border rice price is $340/mt  and price Table  7  -- Model  input:  measurement of support 
Japan 
Price intervention COlllpOl'lent  of producer subsidy equivalent  (PSE):  84% 
Producer  incentive price (U.S.  dollar/metric ton):  $2123 
Reference price: S340 
Price wedge/twitf equivalent:  $1783 
South lor_ 
Tai..., 
Price intervention c~  of PSE:  741 
Producer  incentive price (U.S.  dollar/Illetric ton):  $1039 
Reference price:  $270 
Price wedge/tariff equivalent:  $769 
Pr  i ce  i ntervent  i on coqxll'leflt  of PSE:  361 
Producer  incentive price (U.S.  dollar/metric ton):  $567 
Reference price:  S363 
Price wedge/tariff equivalent:  $204 
European ec-nity 
Japonic. 
Price intervention component  of PSE:  451 
Intervention price (ECU/Illetric  ton):  314.19 
Price wedge/export  subsidy:  173 
.lJ:Sig 
Threshold price (ECU/_tric ton):  542.47 
Reference price (U.S.  No.2  Mill,  41  - Rotter~, ECU):  368.45 
Price wedge/tariff equivalent:  174 
Sources:  Webb  and  others (1990),  and  USDA,  ERS  (1990e). 
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intervention component  of the  PSE  is 84  percent.  A producer  incentive price is 
calculated as  $2l23/mt.  The  difference between the  incentive price and border 
reference price is interpreted as  a  tariff equivalent of price distorting policies  -
- $l783/mt.  In the course of the baseline model  run,  the  producer  incentive prices 
remain fixed.  This  fixity captures policymakers'  decisions  to  isolate their rice 24 
sectors  from  the world market. 
Liberalization in Japonica Rice  Market 
It is assumed that partial liberalization follows  the path set out by  the u.s.  1989 
GATT  proposal  for  a  five year period commencing  in the  1992  crop year.  There are 
several relevant aspects  to  the u.s.  proposal.  All nontariff trade barriers are  to 
be  converted to tariff equivalents.  The  base period for  conversion is an average  of 
the  1986-88 period.  These  tariffs are  to be  reduced  75  percent over  a  10 year  time 
period  (although in the  scenario only  the first 5  years  are modeled).  Countries  that 
have effectively barred imports  in the past are  to provide for minimum  import  access 
for barred commodities.  Minimum  access  is to be  set at the higher of base period 
imports  or  3  percent of base period consumption.  Minimum  access  amounts  are  to 
increase  75  percent over  the  ten year  time  period.  For  exporters  (like the  EC)  there 
is to be  a  90  percent reduction in quantity exported with subsidies  over  the  10 year 
time  period.  Additionally,  internal support that distorts  trade  is to be  reduced  75 
percent over  10 years.  The  reduction measurement  is to be based on an Aggregate 
Measurement  of Support  (AMS).  The  AMS  includes  the effects of market price supports, 
deficiency payments,  and certain forms  of input subsidies. 
Effects of Reform  in Liberalizing Countries 
Table  8  shows  supply and utilization outcomes  for Japan,  South Korea,  and  the  EC. 
The  case of Taiwan is dealt with below.  Results  from  the baseline,  and  from 
unilateral and multilateral liberalization runs  are  shown,  along with ratios of 
variables  from  the liberalization runs  relative to  the baseline. Table 8  -- St.Iloll!:  pro ysiljz8$jon psulg; J!9!¥!.  !2!!th Korea.  a1d  the EC 
lllseline  a..nateral Liberalization
1  Multilateral  Ltberalizati~ 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
6illi2D mesrie Sons 
Japan  leg. Stocks  2.495  2.705  2.398  1.88  1.599  2.495  2.689  2.438  2.34  2.271  2.495  2.698  2.53  2.415  2.332 
Production  9.057  1.284  7.826  7.823  7.821  1.775  1.082  1.351  6.94  6.71  1.775  1.157  7.341  6.96  6.682 
COOSUilption  1.846  1.592  1.344  1.104  1.171  1.17  1.645  1.406  8.192  7.991  8.861  '.637  1.385  8.178  7.95 
TrllCle  0  0  0  0  0  -.29  -.311  -.957 -1.183  -1.232  -.29  -.311  -.93 -1.135  -1.208 
Ending  stocks  2.705  2.398  1.11  1.599  1.55  2.689  2.438  2.34  2.271  2.222  2.698  2.53  2.415  2.332  2.212 
S.  Korea  leg. Stocks  1.283  1.18  1.009  .768  .457  1.283  1.373  1.451  1.52  1.581  1.283  1.371  1.449  1.514  1.512 
Production  4.574  4.574  4.574  4.574  4.574  4.459  4.502  4.387  4.304  4.208  4.459  4.561  4.433  4.549  4.399 
ConsUilption  4.671  4.745  4.815  4.185  4.956  4.705  4.821  4.927  5.041  5.156  4.682  4.802  4.825  4.957  5.01 
Tracie  0  0  0  0  0  -.336  -.398  -.609  -.799 -1.004  -.312  -.319  -.456  -.468  -.662 
Ending  stocks  1.18  1.009  .768  .457  .075  1.373  1.451  1.52  1.581  1.636  1.371  1.449  1.514  1.512  1.623 
EC  leg.  Stocks  .399  .405  .411  .416  .422  .399  .409  .421  .436  .452  .399  .409  .421  .436  .452 
Productfon  1.357  1.366  1.375  1.384  1.393  1.343  1.338  1.332  1.325  1.317  1.343  1.338  1.332  1.325  1.317 
ConsUilpt i on  .947  .971  .994  1.019  1.044  .971  1.032  1.099  1.173  1.256  .971  1.032  1.099  1.173  1.256 
Trade  .404  .39  .375  .36  .344  .362  .294  .219  .136  .043  .362  .294  .219  .136  .043 
Ending  stocks  .405  .411  .416  .422  .428  .409  .421  .436  .452  .471  .409  .421  .436  .452  .471 
Batio releSiX! t2 baseline 
Japan  Beg.  Stocks  1.000  .994  1.017  1.245  1.420  1.000  .997  1.OS5  1.285  1.458 
Production  .969  .976  .939  .887  .858  .969  .985  .938  .890  .854 
ConsUilpt i on  1.003  1.006  1.007  1.011  1.015  1.002  1.005  1.0OS  1.009  1.010 
Trade 
Ending  stocks  .994  1.017  1.245  1.420  1.434  .997  1.OS5  1.285  1.458  1.466 
S.  Korea  Beg.  Stocks  1.000  1.164  1.438  1.979  3.460  1.000  1.162  1.436  1.971  3.440 
Production  .975  .984  .959  .941  .920  .975  .997  .969  .995  .962 
ConsUilpt i on  1.006  1.016  1.023  1.032  1.040  1.001  1.012  1.002  1.015  1.011 
Trade 
Ending  stocks  1.164  1.438  1.979  3.460 21.813  1.162  1.436  1.971  3.440 21.640 
EC  Beg.  Stocks  1.000  1.010  1.024  1.048  1.071  1.000  1.010  1.024  1.048  1.071 
Production  .990  .980  .969  .957  .945  .990  .980  .969  .957  .945 
ConsUilpt i on  1.025  1.063  1.106  1.151  1.203  1.025  1.063  1.106  1.151  1.203 
Tracie  .896  .754  .584  .378  .125  .896  .754  .584  .378  .125 
Ending  stocks  1.010  1.024  1.048  1.071  1.100  1.010  1.024  1.048  1.071  1.100 
_.11  •  not  eppl feeble 
lResul ts  correspond  to  l iberaltzation  by  country  in  leftmost  colum  in  same  row. 
~esults  correspond  to  s i  IILIl taneous  liberal  ization  by  Japan,  South  Korea,  and  the  EC. 
N 
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Japanese price reductions  do  not have  a  discernab1e effect on production until 1994, 
and  a  more  significant effect is not evidenced until 1995.  The  reason that 
production totals are close  in 1992-94  is that the  acreage  reduction program is 
operational in the baseline model.  Declining consumption leads  to higher than 
acceptable stockholding,  and po1icymakers  respond by diverting acreage  away  from 
rice production.  Ending stocks  are within acceptable limits by  1994  and no  further 
acreage  reductions  in the baseline are necessary.  Although not in evidence  in the 
table,  it is the  case if there were  no  minimum  import access,  Japanese  imports  would 
be very insignificant in 1992  and  1993  due  to  an approximate balance between supply 
and  demand at liberalized prices.  Therefore,  model  imports  for  1992  and  1993  are set 
at minimum  access  levels.  Tariff cuts make  for  significant imports  commencing  in 
1994.  By  1996  imports constitute over  15  percent of consumption. 
There  are no  major  differences  for Japan between unilateral and multilateral 
liberalizations.  This  would not be  surprising for  consumption because  a  very  low 
price elasticity of demand  of  -0.055  indicates very sluggish responsiveness  to price 
changes.  Except  for  the  initial year of liberalization,  producers  are  assumed  to 
respond  to  the previous year's price when  determining acreage  planted.  Although 
Japanese  producer  incentive price levels are higher  in the multilateral scenario 
$42/mt  in 1992,  $37/mt  in 1993,  $91/mt  in 1994,  and  $58/mt  in 1995,  they are not 
that much  higher in terms  of percent of baseline producer prices:  2,  2,  4,  and  3 
percentage points,  respectively. 
Liberalization has  significant effects for  South Korea.  Consumption responsiveness 
to price changes  is higher  than that for  the Japanese.  By  1996  rice consumption is 4 27 
percent higher than the baseline for unilateral liberalization (but only 1  percent 
higher for  the multilateral case).  Through  1994  there  is not much  difference in 
production between the unilateral and multilateral cases.  Due  to modest  increases  in 
levels of Japanese  imports  in 1992  and  1993,  world japonica prices  do  not  increase 
that much  over levels produced by  the unilateral South Korean liberalization (see 
table 10).  By  1994,  however,  Japanese  imports  increase substantially and put much 
more  upward pressure  on japonica prices.  In South Korea,  multilateral prices are 
only  3  and  2  percentage points higher relative to baseline values  than the 
unilateral case  for  1992  and  1993,  respectively.  In 1994  the  gap  is 11 percentage 
points,  and is 9  percentage points  in 1995.  Therefore production levels are 
substantially higher  in the multilateral case  for  1995  and 1996.  By  1996,  trade 
constitutes  19  percent of consumption for  the unilateral case but only 13  percent 
for  the multilateral case. 
Unlike Japan and  South Korea,  the  EC  is  a  japonica exporter.  Liberalization there  is 
modeled as  a  yearly reduction in unit export subsidies by  10 percent of the  average 
1986-88 value  over  the  5  year liberalization period.  Domestically this  implies  lower 
producer and consumer prices.  These prices,  however,  are not linked to world 
japonica prices.  There  is,  therefore,  no  difference in the unilateral and 
multilateral cases.  In any  case,  the  level of  EC  exports  drops  substantially:  by 
1996  exports are only 12  percent of their baseline value. 
The  Case  of Taiwan 
Taiwan liberalization was  difficult to model  because of unusual  ending stock levels 
generated by  the model.  The  source  of the problem was  a  lack of a  consistent trend 28 
Table  ?  Taiwanese  Excess  Supply 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Million metric  tons 
Excess  supplyl 
Baseline  0.210  0.253  0.294  0.334  0.372 
Liberalization  0.199  0.232  0.264  0.295  0.326 
Trade 
Baseline  0.163  0.163  0.163  0.163  0.163 
Liberalization  0.270  0.292  0.315  0.339  0.363 
1  excess  supply - production less consumption. 
in ending stocks prior to  the model's base period.  The  inconsistency made  the 
modeling of an ending stocks adjustment path to a  desired level based on  a  set 
proportion of consumption difficult.  Table  9  summarizes  some  results  from  the 
unilateral Taiwanese  liberalization using the  same  stock parameter values  as  used 
for Japan.  The  bottom row  shows  Taiwan becoming more  of a  net exporter than in the 
baseline  -- by  1996 it is exporting 200  thousand tons,  a  fairly high amount. 
However,  the rise in exports is generated from  a  stocks  reduction over  the 
liberalization time horizon. 
The  first two  rows  of the  table  show  the extent to which production exceeds 
consumption in the baseline and liberalized scenarios.  Although  there  is a  trend 
toward excess  supply in both cases,  the differences between the  two  scenarios are 29 
small.  In short,  tariff reductions  reduce  Taiwanese production,  but with inelastic 
demand,  they  do  little to counteract the  trend toward lower rice consumption.  On 
balance,  trade effects of liberalization are minimal.  Given this and  the modeling 
difficulties,  the  Taiwanese  case  is excluded from  the multilateral liberalization 
scenario.  (Parenthetically,  one  could note  that Taiwan is not a  member  of the  GATT 
and  therefore might not be  expected to abide by negotiated GATT  agreements  to which 
it was  not a  party  (although Taiwan has  generally abided by  GATT  rules  in the 
past).) 
Effect on Prices 
Table  10  shows  price outcomes  and  the ratio of liberalized prices  to baseline prices 
for unilateral and multilateral scenarios.  Figure  2  shows  the effect on milled 
prices diagrammatically,  and  shows  the approximate  contribution of each of the 
liberalizing countries  to  the  total price rise. 
The  effect of the multilateral liberalization on  the world japonica price  (and 
equivalently,  the u.s.  medium  grain milled rice price)  is to  increase it in the 
neighborhood of 65  percent  (the average  over  the  1994-96 period).  This  increase  does 
not occur,  however,  until the  third year of the  liberalization because  the  large 
increase  in Japanese  imports  does  not occur until then.  Although  the u.s.  medium 
grain farm price is affected in a  similar way,  the  increase averaged over  1994-96  is 
only about  18  percent higher than the baseline.  (This  increase,  as will be  seen 
later,  depends  on  the  assumed elasticity value  for  the millers'  demand  for  rough 
rice.  Also,  if more u.s.  rough rice  instead of milled rice were  to be  exported,  the 
effect on  the  farm price would be  stronger.) 30 
Table  10 -- Rice prices 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Basel irw  prices 
u.s.  Long  (fan.)1  5.411  5.484  5.629  5.878  5.806 
u.s.  Nedi~ (fan.)  5.074  5.038  5.072  5.171  5.247 
u.s.  Long,  .illed  14.204  14.164  14.079  14.069  13.898 
u.s.  Medi~, .illed  15.281  15.260  15.349  15.510  15.559 
Thai,  51  broken  205.905  204.812  202.472  202.179  197.489 
aur.a  116.387  113.265  109.084  105.879  101.340 
Japonica (calif.)  336.878  336.416  338.391  341.939  343.007 
Japanese  tiberaUzatian  Ba~i2 r~lgt!v~ ~2 baseliQl 
u.s.  Long  (fan.)  1.002  1.007  1.017  0.961  0.941 
u.s.  Nedi~ (f  ....  )  1.018  1.033  1.127  1.162  1.089 
U.S.  Long,  .illed  1.004  1.007  1.018  1.013  1.009 
u.s.  Nediua,  .illed  1.081  1.077  1.341  1.363  1.331 
Th.l,  51  broken  1.008  1.014  1.034  1.025  1.018 
Surma  1.003  1.005  1.011  1.000  0.997 
Japanica (calif.)  1.081  1.077  1.341  1.363  1.331 
South (oreal tiberalizatian 
u.s.  Long  (fan.)  1.003  1.009  0.970  0.920  0.920 
u.s.  Nedi~ (fa  ...  )  1.022  1.042  1.048  1.043  1.042 
u.s.  Long,  .illed  1.005  1.009  1.002  0.998  1.002 
u.s.  Mediua ••  illed  1.096  1.102  1.163  1.200  1.261 
Thai,  51  broken  1.010  1.017  1.004  0.995  1.004 
Burma  1.003  1.006  0.995  0.989  0.994 
Japonica (calif.)  1.096  1.102  1.163  1.200  1.261 
EC  l iberalizatian 
u.s.  Long  (fa  ...  )  1.002  1.003  1.004  1.007  1.010 
u.s.  Nediua  (fan.)  1.003  1.Ooa  1.015  1.029  1.044 
u.s.  Long,  .illed  1.003  1.003  1.004  1.005  1.007 
U.S.  Medius.  .illed  1.012  1.025  1.041  1.060  1.083 
Thai,  51 broken  1.006  1.006  1.0oa  1.010  1.013 
Iunaa  1.003  1.001  1.003  1.003  1.005 
Japani ca (cali f.)  1.012  1.025  1.025  1.044  1.063 
Multilateral  libaralizatian 
U.S.  Long  (fan.)  1.006  0.980  0.942  0.889  0.885 
u.s.  Nedi ..  (fan.)  1.052  1.067  1.181  1.143  1.206 
u.s.  Long,  .illed  1.012  1.009  1.013  1.010  1.013 
u.s.  Nedi ..  ,  _llad  1.207  1.188  1.611  1.534  1.824 
Thai,  51 broken  1.024  1.018  1.025  1.020  1.026 
Buna  1.008  1.001  0.996  0.991  0.991 
Japonica  (Calif.)  1.207  1.188  1.611  1.534  1.824 
i  u.s.  prices •• Dollars/cwt 
2  World  prices  00  Dollars/mt 
Indica prices are affected somewhat  but not  in any  major way.  There  exists,  however, 
the possibility of a  decline in the U.S.  long grain farm  level prices.  Table  11 Figure  2 
Multilateral  Rice  Liberalization 
Cumulative Effect of Liberalization 
on  Japonica Prices 
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shows  U.S.  rough rice supply and utilization.  The  bottom row  shows  stock-to-use 
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ratios.  The  liberalization scenario ratios tend to be  lower  than the  corresponding 
ratios for  the baseline,  especially for  the period 1992-94.  The  baseline ratios 
average high enough to cause ARP's  to be adjusted upward  in the model  to bring the 
ratio in the  .165  to  .200  range.  Because  this adjustment is not necessary in the 
liberalization scenario,  relatively more  land is in use  producing both long and 
medium  grain rice in that scenario.  With no  corresponding  increase in indica demand 
as with japonica,  the U.S.  long grain farm price  tends  to decline as U.S.  long grain 
production increases relative to baseline values. 
Effect on U.S.  Rice  Sector 32 
Table  11  -- u.s.  rough  rice  suPPly  and  utilization 
Baseline  Multilateral  Li bera li  zat  i on  scenario 
Million  CWT 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Long  Grain 
Beginning  stocks  12.229  15.351  14.029  11.679  8.952  12.229  14.671  16.281  18.216  20.955 
Production  125.353  118.697  113.697  108.217  110.973  125.353  125.113  126.466  128.407  130.505 
Demand:  122.230  120.020  116.048  110.945  110.816  122.911  123.503  124.531  125.668  126.364 
Seed  2.611  2.472  2.368  2.254  2.311  2.611  2.606  2.634  2.674  2.718 
Rough  exports  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579  2.579 
Milled  117.040  114.969  111.101  106.112  105.926  117.721  118.318  119.318  120.415  121.067 
Ending  stocks  15.351  14.029  11.679  8.952  9.108  14.671  16.281  18.216  20.955  25.096 
Mediun  Grain 
Beginning  stocks  19.892  23.615  25.219  24.084  21.098  19.892  17.285  19.116  11.688  14.737 
Production  52.417  50.460  47.482  45.059  45.395  52.417  55.592  56.992  66.136  66.186 
Demand:  48.695  48.855  48.618  48.044  47.401  55.024  53.761  64.420  63.087  69.536 
Seed  1.092  1.051  .989  .938  .945  1.092  1.158  1.187  1.3n  1.379 
Rough  exports  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682  .682 
Milled  46.921  47.122  46.947  46.424  45.n4  53.250  51.921  62.551  61.028  67.475 
Ending  stocks  23.615  25.219  24.084  21.098  19.092  17.285  19.116  11.688  14.737  11.387 
Stock-to-use ratio  .228  .232  .217  .189  .178  .180  .200  .158  .189  .186 Acreage planted to rice  increases substantially as  a  result of the  trade 
liberalization.  Table  12  shows  that by  1996  total rice acreage planted increases 
from  2,560  thousand acres  in the baseline to  3,229  thousand acres,  a  26  percent 
Table  12  -- Model  result; u.s.  rice acreage planted -- 1996 
Baseline 
Acreage  Proportion 
P1anted1  of Total 
Long  grain  1920  0.75 
Medium  grain  640  0.25 
Total  2560  1.00 
1  Thousand acres 
Liberalization 
Scenario 
Acreage  Proportion 
Planted  of Total 
2250  0.70 
979  0.30 







increase.  Medium  grain acreage  is  53  percent higher,  while  long grain acreage is 17 
percent higher.  Medium  grain's proportion of total rice acreage  is  30  percent,  which 
is 5  percentage points higher  than in the baseline. 
Table  13  shows  model  results for acreage planted for  the rice producing states. 
Figure  3  depicts acreage planted for  1996.  Acreage planted to medium  grain increases 
in all states,  but is especially important  in California,  where  most medium  grain is 
grown,  and also Louisiana  (a 120  percent increase by 1996).  Unlike  the  other 
Southern states,  Louisiana long grain acreage planted is less than in the baseline, Table  13  -- Acreage  Dlanted 
1992  1993 
Long  grefn 
Arkansas  1153.699  1081.514 
California  39.927  37.197 
Louisiana  361.325  335.077 
Mississippi  258.488  240.442 
Missouri  83.617  78.337 
Texas  384.472  359.403 
Long grafn 
Arkansas  1.000  0.998 
Cal Hornia  1.000  0.986 
Louisiana  1.000  0.983 
Mississippi  1.000  1.000 
Missouri  1.000  1.000 
Texas  1.000  1.000 
Long  grain 
Arkansas  1.000  0.998 
California  1.000  0.983 
Louisiana  1.000  0.979 
Mississippi  1.000  1.000 
Missouri  1.000  1.000 
Texas  1.000  1.000 
Long  grain 
Arkansas  1.000  1.000 
Cal Hornia  1.000  0.999 
Louisiana  1.000  0.999 
Mississippi  1.000  1.000 
Missouri  1.000  1.000 
Texas  1.000  1.000 
Long  grain 
Arkansas  1.000  1.058 
Cal Hornia  1.000  1.018 
Louisiana  1.000  1.014 
Mississippi  1.000  1.072 
Missouri  1.000  1.063 
Texas  1.000  1.065 
1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1994 
laseline  a~reag! elantedi  Sh2Y§!nd  !Ere! 
Medh.- lrefn 
1020.434  958.293  966.515  152.625  144.750  132.301 
36.065  34.532  35.610  429.559  404.571  380.487 
324.756  309.316  319.641  201.541  193.427  170.523 
223.962  207.602  208.882  4.256  4.012  3.611 
73.627  68.944  69.405  2.994  2.838  2.583 
338.013  316.987  320.061  9.836  9.307  8.474 
~ae!ne!e ~!beralilationi Ratio  r!lati~e to acreage elanted  in baS!  tun 
Medil.- Irain 
0.998  1.094  1.112  1.000  1.019  1.026 
0.983  1.002  0.958  1.000  1.006  1.010 
0.979  0.990  0.943  1.000  1.044  1.062 
1.001  1.125  1.156  1.000  1.021  1.028 
1.000  1.107  1.132  1.000  1.020  1.027 
1.001  1.110  1.131  1.000  1.021  1.028 
iouth Korean  biberalizationj Batio telalive tg acr£as! elanted in base  tun 
Medil.- Irain 
1.064  1.127  1.114  1.000  1.022  1.103 
1.035  1.049  1.000  1.000  1.007  1.073 
1.034  1.047  0.995  1.000  1.053  1.154 
1.078  1.161  1.152  1.000  1.025  1.119 
1.068  1.138  1.128  1.000  1.024  1.108 
1.070  1.138  1.124  1.000  1.025  1.110 
(C  Liberalilation: Ratio telativ£ to acreage elanted in base  run 
MediUl grain 
1.000  0.999  0.998  1.000  1.001  1.006 
0.996  0.992  0.984  1.000  1.001  1.002 
0.995  0.990  0.980  1.000  1.003  1.014 
1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.001  1.007 
1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.001  1.007 
1.000  1.001  1.001  1.000  1.002  1.007 
Multilateral  Liberalizationj  Ratio  telative to acr£age elanled in base  run 
MediUl grain 
1.119  1.208  1.200  1.000  1.115  1.231 
1.042  1.004  0.989  1.000  1.073  1.144 
1.038  0.988  0.981  1.000  1.188  1.381 
1.150  1.279  1.270  1.000  1.132  1.267 
1.130  1.237  1.228  1.000  1.121  1.244 
































































.p. Figure  3 
Multilateral  Trade  Liberalization 
Rice  Acreage  Planted -- 1996 










Ark.  Calif  La.  MI ...  Mo. 
Rice Producing States 
_  Medium grain  _  Long grain 
1996 -- Fifth Year of Liberalization 
Tex. 
indicating a  strong reorientation toward medium  grain varieties.  In a  modeling 
sense,  this phenomena  is the result of setting a  higher absolute value of the 
elasticity of substitution in the  CET  acreage planted specification.  Additional 
35 
research may  be  desirable  to test this hypothesized behavior  embedded  in the model. 
Utilization of u.s.  milled rice is shown  in table 14.  Medium  grain exports are very 
much  higher relative to  the baseline  -- starting out at 70  percent higher  in 1992, 
and rising to over  180  percent higher  in 1996.  All domestic uses of medium  grain 
decrease.  To  some  extent long grain demand  for direct food  consumption increases as 
medium  grain declines.  Long  grain exports  increase as well,  but the  increase is less 
dramatic  than that for medium  grain.  It is a  result of expanded supply due  to  lower Table  14  -- Uti I hation  of  U.S.  milled  rice 
Basel ioe  Multilateral  Ii  berali  zat  i on  scenario 
Million M 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
L~  firaln 
Production  70.423  69.117  66.849  63.847  63.736  70.833  71.192  71.794  n.45]  n.846 
Direct  Food  Demand  30.515  31.315  12.254  33.117  34.232  31.841  32.590  35.403  36.125  37.974 
Processed Food  Demand  3.813  3.886  3.939  3.991  4.041  3.453  3.547  2.817  2.965  2.501 
Brewer Demand  .051  .049  .046  .043  .040  .050  .048  .044  .041  .038 
Trade  36.045  33.927  30.611  26.637  25.422  35.489  35.007  33.530  33.322  32.333 
Meeth. Grain 
Production  26.576  26.690  26.591  26.294  25.926  30.161  29.408  35.429  34.566  38.218 
Direct  Food  Demand  9.981  10.199  10.137  10.083  9.936  6.143  6.517  2.768  3.137  1.890 
Processed Food  Demand  3_555  3.608  3.529  3.458  3.344  1.899  2.022  .628  .734  .355 
Brewer Demand  .040  .038  .034  .031  .028  .023  .023  .008  .008  .OOS 
Trade  13.000  12.845  12.891  12.723  12.618  22.096  20.846  32.025  30.687  35.968 
Broken 
Production  18.394  18.179  17.719  17.093  17.002  19.151  19.076  20.332  20.294  21.061 
Processed  Food  Demand  5.094  5.586  6.225  6.882  7.662  4.671  5.233  4.680  5.410  5.073 
Brewer Demand  13.984  14.370  14.787  15.204  15.654  14.011  14.408  14.901  15.318  15.814 
Tracie  -.684  -1.778  -3.293  -4.992  -6.313  .469  -.565  .751  -.434  .174 
8atio [elative So  baseline 
L~  Grain 
Production  1.006  1.029  1.074  1.135  1.143 
Direct  Food  Demand  1.043  1.041  1.098  1.089  1.109 
Processed  Food  Demand  .906  .913  .715  .743  .619 
Brewer  Demand  .980  .980  .957  .953  .950 
Trade  .985  1.032  1.095  1.251  1.2n 
Meeti&.- Grain 
Production  1.135  1.102  1.332  1.315  1.474 
Direct  Food  Demand  .615  .639  .273  .311  .190 
Processed Food  Demand  .534  .560  .178  .212  .106 
Brewer  Demand  .575  .605  .235  .258  .179 
Tracie  1.700  1.623  2.484  2.412  2.851 
Broken 
Production  1.041  1.049  1.147  1.187  1.239 
Processed Food  Demand  .917  .937  .752  .786  .662 
Brewer  Demand  1.002  1.003  1.008  1.007  1.010 
Tracie  -.686  .318  -.228  .087  -.028 
0_11  •  not  applicable 
w 
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than baseline ARP's  rather than expanded  demand. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis  is a  necessary component  in all modeling activity.  It is 
especially true  in the present context because  there are no  well-agreed upon values 
for certain parameters used in the world rice model.  Of particular concern is the 
value of millers'  demand  elasticity for  rough rice.  This elasticity is  important  in 
accounting for how  much  of the  change  in milled rice prices is transmitted to  farm 
level prices.l 
The  procedure  followed here  is to  specify a  range of values  for  the elasticity 
ranging  from  -0.5  (inelastic response)  to  -9.0  (very elastic response),  run  through 
the baseline and liberalization scenarios,  and  compare  the results with  the main 
model  results.  Table  15  shows  modeling results for u.s.  rice  trade  and table 16,  for 
u.s.  prices. 
Cutting the elasticity in half shows  reduced rice trade relative to  the  main model 
results.  u.s.  medium  grain milled rice prices  for  1994-96  average  about  18 
percentage points higher  in the  low elasticity version  (84 versus  66  percentage 
points),  while medium  grain farm prices average  about  the  same.  The  important aspect 
is that the margins  between milled and  farm prices  increase dramatically when  the 
elasticity is  lowered.  Conversely,  assuming  a  greater elasticity value  lowers  the 
lIn the longer version of this paper,  cases are examined where elasticities 
of substitution in the U.S.  CES  demand structure are varied and where deviations 
from assumed yield and production growth trends are allowed for.  Results do  not 
differ much  from  those  already reported above. Table  15  -- Sensitivity analysis:  u.s.  rice trade 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
Ratio relative to base  runs 
Main  model 
Long  grain  0.985  1.032  1.095  1.251 
Medium  grain  1.700  1.623  2.484  2.412 
rp  - -0.5 
Long  grain  0.980  0.978  0.936  1.036 
Medium  grain  1.653  1.547  2.309  2.018 
rp  - -9.0 
Long  grain  0.988  0.992  1.122  1.248 
Medium  grain  1. 747  1.709  2.543  2.806 
rp  - Price elasticity of U.S.  rice millers'  demand  for  rough rice 









gap.  When  the elasticity is set equal  to  -9.0 and model  scenarios are run,  average 
medium  farm prices for  1994-96  are  48  percent higher than baseline values,  and  the 
corresponding milled prices are only 59  percent higher.  Assuming more  elastic demand 
allows  a  greater pass-through of the  increased milled demand  to  the  farm  sector, 
which  in turn induces  a  greater supply response.  The  greater supply response 
diminishes  the price gain to  the milling sector  (that is,  a  59  percent gain as 
opposed  to 66  percent in the main model). 
These  results highlight some  of the  concerns  that producers have  regarding the 
benefit to them of the liberalization.  This research has not dealt with  the 
competitiveness  of the milling sector and its relationships  to its dominant  input Table  16  Sensitivity analysis:  U.S.  rice prices 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
Ratio relative to base run 
Main  model 
U.S.  Long  (fara)  1.006  0.980  0.942  0.889 
U.S.  Medium  (fara)  1.052  1.067  1.181  1.143 
U.S.  Long,  milled  1.012  1.009  1.013  1.010 
U.S.  Medium,  milled  1.207  1.188  1.611  1.534 
rp  - -0.5 
U.S.  Long  (fara)  1.004  1.014  1.034  0.948 
U.S.  Medium  (farm)  1.027  1.050  1.169  1.169 
U.S.  Long,  milled  1.015  1.018  1.035  1.030 
U.S.  Medium,  milled  1. 238  1.198  1. 777  1.527 
rp  - -9.0 
U.S.  Long  (farm)  1.009  1.012  0.994  0.986 
u.s.  Medium  (farm)  1.137  1.152  1.455  1.279 
U.S.  Long,  milled  1.010  1.014  1.004  1.002 
U.S.  Medium,  milled  1.170  1.182  1.542  1. 367 
rp  - Price elasticity of U.S.  rice millers'  demand  for  rough rice 














suppliers  (rice producers).  The  importance of this area should be  acknowledged, 
however,  and more  research effort directed toward it. 
Summary 
Multilateral rice trade liberalization would have  strong effects for medium  grain 
rice in the United States.  The  strength of these effects might not be felt for  a 
couple of years after the  liberalization has begun because of minimal Japanese 
39 40 
imports  in the first couple of years of liberalization.  The  size of Japanese  rice 
stocks relative to consumption at the  time of the  initialization of liberalization 
would be  an  important indicator of their likely level of imports.  Rice millers would 
benefit more  than producers,  although this is an area that merits  further research. 
An  implication is that it may  be  in the interest of producers  to  encourage  the 
export of rough rice to potential customers.  There  seems  to be little benefit from 
liberalization to  long grain producers.  There  may  be  some  increases  in long grain 
exports,  but these  increases result from  increased production due  to smaller ARP's, 
and  they have price depressing effects. 
These  results  imply that California producers will be  the major beneficiaries of 
more  open world rice markets.  To  a  lesser extent,  Louisiana producers  should 
benefit.  Moreover,  this research suggests  that more  attention should be  directed to 
the  trade-off between long grain and medium  grain production in the  southern United 
States.  An  interesting question concerns  the  likelihood of technical  developments 
that would allow medium  grain varieties meeting foreign  (especially Japanese) 
quality standards  to be  grown  in the  Southern states.  Are  the projected increases  in 
medium  grain rice prices sufficiently high to justify additional research 
expenditure? 41 
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